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PlJBLIC UTILITIES AilD SOLAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
Roger G. Noll* 
In the past few years, prospects for early commercialization 
of solar technology have brightened considerably. Both gas and 
electric utilities are beginning to find selected uses of s olar 
technology that appear cost-effective. 
Since the Federal Power Commission began regulating the 
field price of natural r,as that is sold in interstate mar;rnts, 
supplies of gas have dwindled rapidly.
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The opportunities available 
to gr1s utilities for increasing their fuel supp lies -- primarily 
imported liquified natural gas and gassified coal involve sufficiently 
high costs that, for so:ne uses, solar technology for space and water 
heating now stands on the brink of economi c  viability when used in 
tandem with gas. More recently, regulatory interventions to use 
administrative mechanisms rather than prices to allocate what gas 
is available threaten to cut off some gas users regardless of their 
wi�l:Lngness to pay. For these uses, solar heating holds the promise 
of being the next best alternative to gas, especially if the alternative 
energy source must " d  . . 1 d d . 2 avo1. serious environment-a '"egra ation .. 
'"i'' 
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Costs have also risen more rapidly than the overall rate 
of inflation in the e lectricity industry. Rising fuel prices , wh ile 
troubling , are only a relatively small part of the story . Increasin :;ly 
stringent environmental standards have added several hundred dollars 
per kilowatt to the costs of coal , oil and nuclear facilities, while
the unavailability of gas and exp loitable hydroelectric sites has
nevertheless forced the industry to rely exclusively on these more
expensive alternatives in expanding generation capacity . In some
areas, substituting solar energy systems for electricity in selected 
,uses , s uch as heating and air conditioning , appears to be an 
economical alternative to expanding generation capacity to satisfy
growing energy demand . 
Gas and electric utilities have begun to show considerable 
interest in exploiting solar technology . In some states, utilities 
have p ropose d that state regulatory commissions permit them to 
market solar energy as part of a combined energy package.3 The 
issue f acing regulators is how they should structure the emerging
solar energy industry. 
Solar energy presents three major p roblems to utilities
and thei r  regulators: 
1. The technology of solar energy is not consistent 
with the natural-monopoly rationale for public
utilities , and thereby threatens to e rode the utility 
industries. 
2. Nevertheless , solar rarely is an economical total 
substitute for conventional energy , and ,  because of
its dependence on weather conditions , may have little 
or no effect on p eak demand and , therefore , the 
capacity requirements of conventional utilities . 
3. For the most part, the existing methods of pricing
gas and electricity provide the wrong incentives to
utilities , utility custome rs and commerci al solar
energy firms . 
Each of these issues i,; examined in this pap e r .  The paper first
examines the ways in which the p resent structure of the utility 
sector is af fected by and will affect the devleopment of commercial 
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solar energy systems , and the likely consequences of alternative 
structures . The pap e r  then turns to an examination of the relationship
of the p attern of energy demand and of pricing policies to the 
attractiveness of solar energy systems . The underlying theme of 
both sections is that an essential component of a rational public 
policy towards solar energy , or towards any exotic energy source,
is a carefully planned restructurin g  of existing regulatory policies
towards the energy sector that makes the pattern of incentives facing 
the users and supp liers of energy more consistent with e f ficient use
of energy resources. 
SOLAR ENERGY AND CENTRALIZED UTILITIES 
Although electricity and other distributed forms of energy
can be produced at a central location using solar energy, the most 
economical methods of using solar energy, at least for the 
foreseeable future, will convert solar radiation to usable energy 
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at the point of use. This is in sharp contrast to the structure of 
utility firms. The essence of a retail energy utility is the 
transportation of energy from a central source to the point of use. 
Electrical energy is most efficiently generated in large facilities 
serving thousands of users. Natural gas is found in a relatively 
few scattered gas fields, and transported through pipes to the homes 
and businesses that use it. 
If solar energy were to capture a large proportion of the 
market from gas and electricity, it could make some of the existing 
distribution capacity obsolete. Moreover, gas utilities, especially, 
sell a fuel that appears to be in very limited long-run supply. 
Consequently, they face a slow corporate death as other energy forms 
replace the share of gas in the total energy market. Thus , on the 
one hand solar energy systems do not appear to have the technical 
characteristics of public utilities, any more than do household 
appliances -- each point of use can have its own, independent solar 
energy system without any cost sacrifice. On the other hand, if 
utilities (and especially gas utilities) do not capture a healthy 
share of the solar energy business, they may face slow extinction 
as the distribution systems of retail utilities are replaced by on-site 
solar collection systems. 
The problem facing regulators is to determine the extent 
to which utilities will control the rate and pattern of development 
and use of solar energy technology . Obviously, a prime force in 
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directing regulatory policy will be the generic difficulty government 
of ficials face in adoj)ting policies that erode the welfare of any 
business: witness th<o problems of the Federal Communications 
Coum1ission in permitting the demise of telegraphy, or of the Congress 
in letting rail passenger service disappear or in permitting the 
bankruptcy of Lockheed. Nevertheless, this paper proceeds under 
the assumption that efficient operation of the energy sector is 
one of the desiderata of energy policy, and examines alternative 
structural arrangements and pricing policies of electric and gas 
utilities in terms of their effects on the development of exotic 
new energy systems such as on-site solar energy equi pment .
ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY POLICIES 
The alternatives available to the regulators fall into
a few general categories. First, public utilities could be given 
exclusive monopoly franchises to provide solar energy systems tc 
substitute for some or all of the other forms of energy used by 
their customers. Thus, gas companies would have exclusive rights 
to construct solar-assisted gas heating systems, such as Project 
SAGE, a system now under development to provide combined solar/gas 
hot water heating.
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Of course, granting an exclusive monopoly to 
a utility for providing an integrated energy system incorporating 
solar equipment would be accompanied by conventional public utility 
regulation of the prices and profits of the solar component of the 
system, just as the coventional component is now regulated. One 
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app roach is to se t a regulated ener gy price, app lying to all ener gy 
used by the customer whether from solar collectors or conventional 
source s .  The gas company would then , in e ffect, own the capital 
investment in the solar collection system and would set energy prices 
so as to return whatever rate of profit the regulators would pe rmit 
on invested capital . Ano ther app ro ach is to allow customers to 
purchase solar equipment f rom the utility , with the company making 
separate charges for the cap ital investment (e ither a lump sum or 
an amor tized installment p lan) and for the amount of conventional
energy consumed. 
A second alternative is to deny utilities exclusive rights 
to sell so lar energy systems, but p ermit them to enter the solar ene rgy 
business as p art of their regula ted public utility activities. The 
utility would o f fer services as in the first case , excep t that 
customers could turn to nonutility firms to  acquire the solar comp onent 
o f  to tal energy service. Gas and electric utilities would o f fer
r e gulated conventional service and regulated solar ve rsions of the 
same se rvice, but would face comp e tition in the solar component. 
A customer desiring a so lar energy system could either buy it f rom 
the utility or continue to buy straight gas or elect ric service 
from the utility but tack on a so lar component that was purchased 
from a third party . 
The third alternative is to allow utilities to sell solar 
systems through a separate , unregulated affiliate. Public utilitie6 
would face compe tition from nonutility organizations for solar 
equipment. Customers facing e ither gas curtailments or simply lower 
total costs from integrated energy systems would select solar
equipment f rom among the· .unregulated compe tito rs. 
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The fourth aLternative is to prohibit utilities from selling 
on-site solar energy systems or the energy derived from them . Utilities 
could still explore the possibilities for using solar energy as a 
centralized energy source, either to generate electricity or to 
gassify hydrocarbon fuels, that would be tied to the utili ty distribution
system, but selling o r renting solar energy converters at the poin t of 
use would be denied them . 
All of the p =e ceding alternatives have precedents in the 
re gulated utility sector. Until the late 1960's , telephone companies 
had exclusive contro l  ove r  the devices interconnected to the switched 
telephone system. A user seeking, say, to acquire an internal switching
system that allowed phones in the same business to call each o the r 
without going through the local telephone exchange had to buy that 
system from the local telephone company. Just as solar energy can 
substitute for some uses of gas or electricity from a utility, so, too,
do extension-to-extension calls in the same business substitute for 
use of the local telephone exchange . Even though the re is no natural 
monopo ly in internal switching systems, until the late 1960's , 
regulato rs nevertheless saw fit to extend the exclusive franshise 
o f  the t elephone company to these and all other devices that could
be at tached to the telephone network. 
Since the Carterfone decision by the Federal Communications 
Commission,
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telephone companies have re tained the right to sell 
t erminal devices, but they no longer have an exclusive monopoly. 
In principle, customers of a telephone company can purchase their 
own telephones from an unregulated entity, or continue to accept 
instruments from the telephone company at a regulated rental rate 
that is included in the price of standard service. Other terminal 
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devices can be rented from the telephone company at regulated tariffs, 
or purchased from competitive suppliers . 
Most utilities have business a ctivities of the third type ; 
that is, certain unregulated activities that are related to the 
regulated service. Some gas and electric companies sell home 
appliances, and some sell repair and maintenance services. Some 
telephone companies may either sell communications equipment at 
unregulated prices or include the use of such equipment as part of 
the company's· service at regulated prices. 
Finally, the fourth arrangement applies to one maJ or utili ·.:y, 
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, which is prohibited 
from engaging in unregulated business except, to a limited extent , 
in the sale of communications equipment. The 1956 Consent Decree 
that settled an antitrust complaint against the Bell System6 prevents 
AT & T from entering such businesses as data processing. Computer 
time-sharing services, which rely on telephone lines to interconnect 
terminals and central processors, can be offered by telephone utilities 
not affiliated with Bell, but cannot be offered by Bell System affiliates.
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Thus, history provides no consistent guide to the appropriate 
way to deal with emerging s ola r energy technology. Neverthele'ss, 
because similar regulatory problems have arisen in the past, the 
conceptual issues involving utility regulation that are pertinent to 
a decision on the structure of the solar energy business have been 
reasonably well formulated. Each potential market structure for a 
new technology, such as solar energy, that threatens an established 
regulated one, such as conventional retail energy, has a range of 
p otenti al advantages and disadvantages. Because the importance of 
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these advantages and disadvantages varies according to the particular 
circumstances of the case, the relevant task is to identify these 
issues and their likely importance in the case of solar energy 
development. 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST SOLAR OWNERSHIP BY UTILITIES 
Public economic policy in the United States, at least since 
the late 19th Century, begins with a presumption in favor of 
competition. The major exception to this principle has been the 
public utilities sector. Around the turn of the Century, most 
communities accepted the argument that public utilities were natural 
monopolies, and conferred upon these firms the right to seek monopoly 
status in. return for subjecting their prices and profits to public 
control through a regulatory authority.8 In all but about forty 
cities across the country, a single firm now supplies electricity, 
gas or telephone service in any given area, and in all but one state 
these activities are r�gulated by a state public utilities commission.9 
Since solar energy technologies, at least for the near 
future, do not exhibit the kind of scale economies that may lead to 
natural monopoly in the utility sector, there is a presumption that 
they should be provided in competitive markets. Moreover, some 
10 
additional problems can be anticipated from allowing energy utilities 
to provide solar technology. 
If regulation is effective in keeping prices below the 
rates a monopolist would charge, it must necessarily create some 
perverse incentives which lead firms away from providing service at 
lowest possible cost. For example, regulated energy utilities can 
earn profits only on investments in physical capital. They cannot 
earn profits on maintenance and installation activities nor on the 
resale of energy. Consequently, a regulated utility has an incentive 
to engage in excessive substitution of capital investments for other 
productive resources.10 Moreover, because the rate-making process 
is based on historical data and consumes considerable time and 
resources in reaching a decision on rate increases, utilities have 
an incentive to avoid financial and technical risks. The effect of 
these incentives on solar energy is to lead utilities to invest in 
solar technology that is too durable, that is excessively efficient 
in converting sunlight to usable energy, and that requires inefficiently 
little maintenance. These strategies increase the capital used in 
exploiting the technology, and insulate the firm from the possibility 
of future increases in noncapital costs. If permitted, this would 
lead to excessive costs and prices for solar energy, and inefficiently 
slow adoption of the technology. 
Similar incentives are also in operation when utilities 
decide whether to invest in solar or other technologies, but their 
net effect is inconclusive. Solar technology appears relatively 
intensive in its use of capital, which is attractive to utilities; 
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however, as a new technology it may also appear relatively risky. 
Whether utilities would, on balance, pursue solar technology with 
excessive vigor or timic1ity probably is not possible to predict in 
advance of an actual market tes t . Nevertheless, utilities did enter 
the marke t for nuclear generation facilities enthusiastically in 
the mid 1960's. Nuclear, like solar, offered considerable uncertainties 
owing to its incomplete s ta t e  of developmen t but the oppor t unity to 
employ a capital-intensive t echnology.
Regulated utilities can use solar technology strategically 
as a means to create internal subsidies within their price structures 
and, thereby, to recapture some of the monopoly profits that regulation 
takes away as well as to foreclose competition in the solar energy 
business. For example, a joint solar/gas utility would have to work 
out a method to allocate its cos ts between solar-assisted and gas-only 
services. If it could effect an allocation that, in fac t, attributed 
too much cost to gas, it wou ld succeed in taking advantage of its 
monopoly in the gas business to subsidize its solar energy business. 
Normally, an unregulated firm would not find such a strategy attractive. 
But regulation provides the incentive to engage in this behavior because 
of the possibility that this strategy will enable the firm to capture 
more monopoly profits from its regulated gas business. 
In principle, perfect regulation could prevent these 
problems, but in practice state regulatory authorities lack the 
resources and information to maintain perfect scrutiny of utility 
operations. Because the utility is always more expert than the 
regulator on the technical and economic conditions facing the firm, 
a technolo gical advance that provides more flexibility in firm 
operations can be used strategically by the utility to work a 
11 better deal from the regulated market . 
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Internal subsidization of the sort described above is not 
a far fetched , abstract notion . To the contrary , it is pervasive in 
b bl. 'J . . 12 Th b . . f . . t ,e pu ic uti .ities sector. e most o vious mani estat1.on is 
rate averaging, in which utilities charge the same price for a 
particular service , regardless of inter-customer variations in the 
cost of p roviding service . Utilities have been especially prone to 
internal subsidization to protect against competitive incursions 
into their markets. Examples include declining price as a function 
of total use by electric utilities, as a mechanism to encourage 
substitution of electric for gas appliances, and the pricing of 
certain communications services by AT & T at less than incr�mental
cost after the Federal Communications Commission permitted the 
entry of some competitive communications firms into long-distance 
communications. 
The fundamental point underlying the previous analysis is 
that a regula ted utility has both the incentive and, to some de gree, 
the ab ility to maintain energy service as a franchised monopoly after 
cost conditions no longer support the conclusion that monopoly is 
natural. Consequently, pricing, investment and even research and 
development strategies will reflect this objective. While regulators , 
conscious of this problem , can attempt to offset it, the information 
and resource advantage of the utility, coupled with the incentive of 
the regulators to avoid cataclysmi c service or financial f ailures by 
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regulated firms, will i;1evitably lead to less than perfect regulation. 
This opens the door to strategic actions by regulated firms that 
increase their profits and secure their monopoly positions, but that 
13 do so at the expense of energy users. 
PROBLEMS OF LIABILITY AND QUALITY CONTROL 
One issue raised in connection with the choice of a role 
for utilities in solar energy pertains to the locus of responsib ili ty 
for the quality of solar energy systems. Solar equipment is normally 
intended to be a long- term capital investment, yet in the early years
of the industry purchasers of the equipment will have little 
information about the durab ility of competing systems. According 
to one study, the early history of solar energy in Florida saw the 
marketin g of some solar heating equipment that was unreliable and 
b. l l . l 14 su Ject to severe ee,age proo ems. The standard approach to 
questions of product quality is to rely upon brand reputations, 
voluntary trade association standards, warranties and producer 
liability to generate adequate incenLives for manufacturers to 
produce reliable equipment. Numerous household appliances water 
heaters, stoves, furnaces -- are as cap ab le , in principle , of causing 
severe damage as are solar heating and air co nditioning units, yet 
the incentives operatir; upon manufacturers are sufficient so that 
product quality in this area does not constitute a severe social 
problem. For example, as of mid-1977, the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, in its four ye ar lifetime, had yet to open a standard-setting 
proceeding for any major home appliance. The products under examination 
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by the CPSC tended to be either products that are inherently dangerous 
and frequently associated with accidents, such as power lawn mowers, 
book matches and bicycles, or products of industries in which the 
industry itself sought to have mandatory standards imposed upon it, 
as was the case with swinmdng pool slides.
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In the long run, solar equipment does not appear to present 
any special problems of product quality beyond those that arise in 
the home appliance industry or with other products that account for 
a major proportion of the budget of consumers. To the extent that 
product risk is a threat to consumers, one would expect the development 
of warranties, brand identification and voluntary standards to cope 
relatively well with the problem. 
Nevertheless, as the industry develops both producers and 
consumers of solar equipment would undoubtedly pass through a 
learning period that was accompanied by the temporary successful 
marketing of equipment that proved to be less reliable than originally 
anticipated. If utilities act as the gatekeeper to solar technology 
for their customers, two advantages might accrue: (1) experience 
with numerous consumers and producers would enable them to learn the 
comparative strengths of equipment more rapidly, and (2) the permanence 
and stability of the utility would o f fer protection to consumers should 
the liability for damages from solar equipment be placed upon the 
utility. Yet there are also disadvantages. Utilities are likely to 
be interested in greater product quality than are consumers, for 
reasons discussed above, and the risk-aversion induced on utilities 
by the regulatory process is likely in any event to make them reluctant 
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to assume such liability with.out exacting an excessive price to cover 
contingencies. 
Government can play a role in promoting reliable solar 
equipment. Government could regulate performance standards for the 
industry, but because technology is evolving rapidly in solar equipment 
standards could become a serious impediment to the maturation of the 
industry. Standards regulation, because of its procedural requirements, 
is inevitably a slow process that produces rules that are di f ficult 
to change and which, therefore, retard product innovation. Another 
possibility is for the government to monitor the developmen t of the 
industry ,  publishing information on the performance of various types 
of equipment as experience develops and imposing some sort of 
truth-in-packaging requirement on equipment manufacturers. The 
attraction of this approach is that it deals directly with the essence 
of the problem , which is to increase the rate of dif fusion of reliable 
product quality in formation among customers of solar equipment . 
THE CASE FOR COMBINED SOLAR UTILITIES 
Several arguments have been advanced in support of granting 
utilities the right to of fer solar energy systems as a regulated activity. 
These arguments generally boil down to an assertion that only utilities 
have the proper incenti·ces to push for solar energy . The argument: 
can take many forms, including relatively unenlight:ening comments 
about the rationality of consumers and potential entrants into the 
solar energy business. But at the heart of the issue is the perverse 
incentive provided to energy users and indirectly to those who would 
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enter the solar energy business by the form of regulated prices for 
energy. In all but a few cases, the price structure for electricity 
and gas does not reflect the true marginal cost of service. Consequently, 
the customers of the utility do not face proper incentives to switch 
to solar energy. This problem is compounded by the fact that solar 
energy systems are rarely a complete substitute for conventional energy. 
While the method of utility pricing differs from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction, the procedure has usually been to set prices equal 
to the average cost of service. In most cases, utility customers are 
divided into groups according to their type of business or use of 
energy. Each group is then charged a price equal to the average cost 
of service for the group, with connnon costs, such as overhead and 
unallocatable capital facilities, allocated among groups according 
to total annual energy use. In some jurisdictions, each group faces 
a tiered price structure, with the price of energy use declining as 
use increases.16 In a few jurisdictions some attempts have recently 
been made to move towards peak-load pricing of electricity , but for 
the most part prices are averaged over peak and off-peak periods. 
Until the late 1960's both ec�nomies of scale and
technological change worked to force down the costs of additional 
energy supply, especially in the electricity business . Since electricity 
prices were not sensitive to peak demands, there was a tendency to 
overbuild capacity, but this was partly offset by the lower average 
cost of new energy. In this milieu, quantity discounts for energy 
use had some economic rat:Lonale, albeit incomplete because of the 
absence of peak-load pricing, in that increments to energy usually 
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did cost less than the average cost of the total supply. In the case 
of natural gas, economies, of scale in distribution systems and the 
absence of a significan:.. cost difference between off-peak and peak periods 
made the declining block rate pricing system quite rational as long as 
natural gas field prices were not increasing . 
Three events changed the situation.
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First, stricter 
environmental controls raised the real costs of electricity generation, 
and since more rigorous standards were applied to new generation 
facilities than to existing ones, costs were increased more for new 
generation plants than for old facilities. Second, inflation and 
higher interest rates caused the costs of energy inputs to begin 
to rise more rapidly than the rate of technical progress in the 
energy sector, so that dollar (if not real) capacity costs began to 
rise rather than fall, as they had for several decades before . Since 
most regulatory comwissions calculate prices based upon the dep reciated 
original cost of capital facilities, rapid inflation served to increase 
the allowed costs of new service but not of service from old capacity. 
Third, the success of the OPEC cartel since 1973 has raised the price 
of not only oil but all fuels substantially more than the overall 
rate of inflation . But long-term contracts and domestic fuel 
regulation have served to give utilities access to some fuel at old 
prices. Hence the average cost of both gas and electricity has been 
held below the price that would reflect the costs of expanding energy 
output, which would be based on the price of new gas, new domestic 
oil, imported oil, or synthetic hydrocarbon fuels. In electricity, 
the inefficiencies arising from the differences between prices based 
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on average cost and the true incremental cost of energy began to 
exacerbate, rather than partly offset, the inefficiencies arising 
from the failure to use peak-load pricing. 
The problem is illustrated in Figure 1, where the solid 
line (MCc) represents the marginal cost of energy from conventional 
sources at various proportions of present output, and the dotted 
line represents the current average cost (AC
c
) and price (Pc). For 
simplicity of exposition, problems of peak versus off-peak costs are 
for the present ignored, all customers are regarded as facing the 
same costs and the price-elasticity of energy demand is presumed to 
be zero; however, the same qualitative conclusions hold for more 
realistic but more complicated cases. The dashed line represents a 
hypothetical marginal cost of solar energy (MC), where increasing s 
amounts of solar energy as a proportion of total energy supply read 
from right to left along the horizontal axis of the diagram as 
reductions in the proportion of energy from conventional sources. 
To minimize total energy costs for society requires expanding solar 
energy to the point at which its marginal cost equals that of other 
energy to point p in the diagram, where (100 - p) percent of 
energy supply comes from solar technology. 
Unfortunately, energy consumers have no incentive at the 
hypothetical current regulated price Pc 
to purchase solar equipment 
at an implicit energy price P
s
. The consequence of their continuing 
to buy energy from conventional sources is that total societal energy 
costs are larger than they could be by the amount of the shaded area 
in Figure 1. 
$ 
* 
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FIGURE. 1: Hypothetical Marginal and Average Costs of Solar and 
Conventional Energy in Relation to Conventional Proportion 
of Total Energy Supply. 
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The failure of electric utilities and their regulators 
to adopt peak-load pricing produces a perverse incentive that favors 
solar energy. Solar energy systems are most efficient when sunlight 
is most intense, but the period of peak electricity demand rarely 
d . h d 18 occurs uring sue per.io s. As a result, the installation of 
solar energy systems is likely to cause a greater reduction in 
electricity demand in off-peak than in on-peak periods. If a user 
faces electricity prices that are based on the average over peak 
and off-peak costs, the financial incentive to reduce off-peak electricity 
demand is as great as the incentive to cut back on peak load. For 
the utility a reduction in off-peak demand lowers its cost by much 
less than does a reduction in peak demand, since the former does 
not reduce the costs of the utility by as much as the latter.1
9 
Consequently, for some customers the financial incentive communicated 
by rate averaging may be sufficient to induce investment in solar 
energy systems that primarily substitute for off-peak electricity, 
even though the cost of the solar system exceeds the savings to the 
utility arising from the reduction in electricity demand due to 
installation of the solar equipment. 
Even though the utility price structure does not communicate 
appropriate cost signals to consumers, utilities nevertheless see the 
actual marginal costs of alternatives and can calculate the appropriate 
division of energy supply between conventional and solar sources. 
Returning to the example in Figure 1, a cost-minimizing utility would 
seek to induce customers to use solar technology until 1 0 0  - p percent 
of total energy was supplied from solar systems. Moreover, since 
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solar technology is more capital intensive than gas or electric supply 
systems, even if cost-minimization is blunted by rate-of-return 
regulation, utilities still are likely to seek to push the development 
of solar energy as long as it reduces total costs of energy. This is 
the basis for the argument that utilities should be given the right 
to sell solar equipment and/ or the usuable energy derived from it. 
In the mid-1970 s, utilities and their regulators began to 
consider revising the price structure for energy so that prices more 
closely reflected the true marginal costs of service. Several states 
have already adopted seasonally variable electricity prices to provide 
additional incentives to cut back electricity demand during the peak 
demand months of summer and winter, and widespread use of both rising 
block rates and time-of-day pricing may be in the offing. The 
Los Angeles municipal utility is currently experimenting with an elaborate 
peak-load pricing scheme,
20 
and several European utilities now use 
. . . bl 21 cost-sensitive varia e pricing systems. 
A peak-load pricing system could eli1�.inate most of the 
perverse incentive in current rate structures to adopt solar energy 
systems which cause an uneconomical reduction in off-peak electricity 
demand. Such schemes can not work perfectly unless quite elaborate 
metering and pricing systems are adopted so that electricity prices 
can vary over very short time intervals. Since the cost of 
implementing peak-load pricing increases with the complexity of the 
system, utilities and regulators are not likely to find a very elaborate 
scheme worthwhile; however substantial savings in total energy 
demand and costs apparently are possible with relatively simple 
22 
adjustments in the pricing structure.
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Apparently the best route 
to solving the problem of excessive investment in solar equipment 
that leads to uneconomical substitutes for off-peak demand is to 
adopt a more rational price structure for electricity. 
Unfortunately, the problems associated with the rising 
costs of new energy resources cannot be solved within the context 
of rate-of-return regulation by reliance on prices based upon 
marginal costs.· Once again, the following analysis will abstract 
from the problems of peaking, although the analysis applies to this 
more complicated pricing problem as well, The following analysis can 
be thought of qualitatively as applying to the price structure 
prevailing in each period, although a complete analysis would have 
to account for interdependencies among l?eriods in costs, capacity and 
demand, In Figure 1, marginal cost pricing would dictate a price 
of conventional energy equal to the topmost portion of MCc' shown 
as P� in the diagram, Eventually, prices set at P� would induce 
solar enei;gy development to 100 - p percent of total energy, at 
which time conventional sources would have a lower marginal cost. 
Assuming that the true conventional marginal cost curve is not, 
as shown, discontinuous at p, but instead merely is rising in that 
region and passes solar energy marginal costs at p, the long run 
price for all types of energy would converge to Ps. Unfortunately, 
such pricing is inconsistent with much of the purpose of utility 
regulation. In the long run, utility prices equal to Ps would 
generate excess profits for the utility as measured by the area 
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between the Ps line and the MCc curve to the left of point p. And, 
since energy using equipment is normally a rather long-lived capital 
asset, several years would transpire before solar energy accounted 
for 100 - p percent of total energy. Meanwhile, utilities would, at 
price P�, earn even larger excess profits, equal to the area between 
P� and MCc 
to the left of point p. 
The normal response to an incompatability between pricing 
at marginal cost and limiting utilities to a competitive rate of return 
is to invoke a multipart price structure. Each consumer is asked to 
pay a low price for the first few units consumed that is based upon 
the low cost of these un-".ts and then 
·
to face ever increasing prices 
for additional consumption, with these prices reflecting ever higher 
costs for newer sources of energy. In the simplified case shown 
in Figure 1, consumers would face a price P for the first p percent 
c 
of their anticipated consumption, and then a price P� for proportions 
above p of total energy use devoted to conventional sources. 
Figure 2 represents a more complicated, and more realistic, 
hypothetical.example of the utility pricing problem. Like Figure 1, 
Figure 2 abstracts from peaking problems, demand elasticities, and 
differences among energy users in the demand for energy or the cost 
of solar equipment. Unlike Figure 1, the situation shown in Figure 
2 depicts the marginal costs of providing energy to a particular 
user for various proportions of that customer's total energy demand 
that is accounted for by conventional (MCc reading left to right) 
and solar (MCs reading right to left) sources. in Figure 2, the 
solar energy cost curve is constructed to illustrate crudely the 
actual situation for a particular point of energy use: scale 
economies in solar energy systems for the first few percentage 
points of energy accounted for by solar, and then rising costs as 
24 
the solar proportion rises. The conventional source cost curve (MCc) 
assumes that all energy will reflect the high costs of new conventional 
sources, which enter the calculation of P�. In the case shown, the 
minimum cost energy system is to devote q percent of energy use to 
conventional sources and the rest to solar. 
The diagram is constructed to illustrate a problem with 
the use of marginal cost pricing to induce solar energy conversion. 
In Figure 2, point p represents the same point as in Figure 1, e. g., 
the proportion of society's total energy de�and that ought to be 
devoted to conventional energy, based upon the lower costs of old 
energy sources. The dotted line in Figure 2 dipicts the price of 
solar energy if 100 - q percent of a customer's energy is from solar 
technology. The dashed line is the two part price structure shown 
in Figure 1 that prices conventional energy beyond p percent demand 
at the marginal cost of new supplies but conventional energy for 
the first p percent at the lower average cost of old supplies. 
As the diagram is drawn, the customer facing the high 
marginal cost of new energy over all ranges of energy use has an 
incentive to shift to 100 - q percent solar because the cost savings 
in the left-most shaded area offset the cost disadvantages of 
solar in the right-most shaded area. But if the price structure 
represented by the dashed line is imposed, letting customers face 
the appropriate price incentives for the last units of energy 
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FIGURE 2 :  Hypothetical Marginal Costs and Prices for a Representative 
Customer for �olar and Conventional Energy in Relation to 
Customer's Proportion of Energy Accounted for by 
Conventional Sources. 
cons ume d . b ut p reventing the ut i l i ty from earning exc e s s  p r o f i t s , 
consumers will n o t  us e any s o lar ene r gy . The reason is tha t at p 
p e rcent conven t ional ene r gy , s o lar p r i c e s  mus t be h i gher than Ps . 
In p ar t i c ular , they mus t recove r  the h i gh co s t s  o f  the firs t f ew 
un i t s  o f  s o lar ene r gy wi thout b e n e f i t  o f  the addi t i onal s cale 
e conomie s b e tween p and q .  As shown , the l o s s e s  in the r i gh t-mos t 
shaded area will o f fs e t  the p o tential c o s t- s avings in that p o r t ion 
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o f  t h e  l e f t-mos t shaded area that l i e s  t o  t h e  r igh t o f  p o in t  p .  In 
o th e r  wo rds , marginal c o s t  p ricing of the l a t t e r  s o r t , wh i l e  p roviding 
p ro p e r  incentives a t  the margin , s t i l l  fails the t o tal conditions for 
e f f i cien t ene rgy s elec t ion , given the p a r t i c ular f o rm of the co s t  
curve s as s ume d in Fi gure 2 .  
The underlying p rob lem dep i c t e d  in Fi gure 2 i s  tha t  the
o p t imal p rop o r t ion of s o lar ene r gy for a p a r t i cular cus t omer i s  no t 
equal to the o p t imal p r o p o r ti on f o r  s o c i e ty . Henc e , the market 
s i gnals convey ed by a mul t i p a r t  p ri cing s t ructure b as e d  up o n  mar g inal 
c o s t s  b ut r e t urnin g n o  exce s s  p r o f i ts to the u t i l i ty p rovi d e  inap p r o p r i a t e  
incen t ive s . In p a r t i cular , the marke t d o e s  no t induce a relative ly 
small ( s maller than p )  pe rcent o f  energy c us t ome rs to demand mor e  
s o l ar ene r gy ( q  p e r cent o f  the i r  t o tal us e )  than i s  o p t imal as a 
s o c i e ty-wide aver age . Cons equen t ly , no universal p ri c e  s t ructure 
can b e  cons tructed th a t  b y  i t s e l f  p r o vides app rop ria t e  incent ives to 
cus t ome rs to develop s o lar ene r gy and holds utility mono p o lies t o  a 
c omp e t i t ive r a t e  o f  p ro f i t .  
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S OME S OLUT IONS TO THE POLICY PROBLEM
If b o th the u t i l i ty and the s o lar ene r gy indus t r i e s  were
p e r f e c t ly comp e t i t ive , an optimal p ro p o r t ion o f  s o lar ener gy would 
eventually develop . This is b e cause compe t ition woul d n o t  allow 
p ri c e  d i f f e rentials to p e r s i s t  b e tween o l d  and new s o urces o f  
conven t ional ene r gy . Ho lders o f  o l d  s o urc e s , s uch a s  o l d  gas and 
o i l  wells or gen e r a t i on f a c i l � t i e s  constru c t e d  b e f o r e  the recent
spate of inflat i on , woul d  exp e r i ence c ap i t a l  gains that val ue d  the 
s our ces un de r  the i r  contro l at the i r  o p p o r t uni ty co s t s  in terrrs o f  
new ene rgy s ources . All ene r gy use would then b e  p r i c e d  at the 
mar ginal cos t of new s ources , and u t i l i t i e s  would s t ill earn a 
comp e t i t i ve re turn -- b u t on as s e t s  who s e  value s  re f l e c t e d  the s e  
cap i t a l  gain s . O f  c o urs e ,  these c ap i tal gains w o u l d  b e  equivalent 
in value t o  the exce s s  of revenues over the marginal c o s t s  (b as ed 
up on original cos t s )  shown in Figure 1 .  The incomp a t ib i li ty b e tween 
e f fi cient adop t ion of sol ar t e chno l o gy and energy p ri c ing p o l i cy 
ari s e s  b e caus e the l a t t e r  a t t emp t s  n o t  only to p revent monop o ly 
p r o f i t s , b u t  t o  prevent as well the wind fall gains a comp e ti t ive 
ind us t ry wo uld rece ive if o l d  inve s tmen ts app rec ia t e d  in value owing
t o  an incre a s e  in the cos t of new inve s tmen t s . 
The preceding argument does no t s up p o r t  the conclusion 
that a t i e r e d  ra te s t ruc t ur e  i s  unde s i rab le .  I f  ene r gy cus tomers
d i f f er a c c o rding to the a t t r a c t i vene s s  o f  solar ene r gy t o  them , 
s ome j us ti f i ab l e  swi t ch to s o lar t e chno logy wi ll be induced by 
making the p ri c e  of t he las t  uni t s  of c o nven t i onal ene r gy refle c t
their s o ci a l  c o s t s . Mo reove r , i f  the a s s ump tion i s  relaxed that the 
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demand fo r energy is perfectly ine las ti c ,  s ome additional gains in 
ene rgy cons e rvat ion will result  from the kind of multipart price 
s truc t ure dis cus s e d  here . What the. p roceding analysis doe s  show is 
that this mul tipart price s t ruc ture is likely to be ins ufficient
to gen e rate a s o cially e f f i. cient extent o f  solar development . 
Granting utilities the r ight to sell s olar equipment does 
not completely eliminate the p rob lems inherent in the regulated price 
s t ructure . In addi t ion , some p rovis ion mus t b e  made for deci ding which 
cus tome rs are forced to conve rt to  solar sys tems . In the s ituation
dip.icted  in Fi gure 2 ,  s ome energy users  would have to b e  required to 
acquire 1 0 0  - q p e rcent of their energy f rom s o lar equipment despite
the fact that they would b e  unwilling to do s o  unle s s  their to tal
energy expenditures were subs tantially higher than is the case under 
the exis t in g  rate s tructure for convent ional ener gy . 
Regulators have thus far cons idered two approaches to  
this p rob lem . One is t o  allocate rights  to low- cos t conventional energy 
to p articular group s  o f  cus t omers , as has b een done with respect to 
natural gas . The s econd is to adopt a p rice s cheme that recove rs
from all cus tomers the average co s t  of p roviding s o lar ener gy to some 
and only conven tional energy to o thers . 
The fi rs t me tho d would s ingle out s ome energy cus tomers 
to face conventional ener gy p rices b ased exclus ively on new ener gy 
s ources , as re flected in MC
c 
in Figure 2 ,  for all ene r gy cons umed 
beyond q percent o f  to tal energy cons ump t ion . The remainin g  cus tomers
would face only the price based upon old s ource s , P . If the s i ze 
c 
of the two groups were appropriately pi cked , the end result would be 
--r-
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the approp riate one : 100 - p percent o f  energy use from s o lar s ources . 
In essence , this me tho d  trans fers the windfall gains that would have 
accrued to owners of old convent ional sources to cus tome rs , with mos t  
o f  the gain go ing to  tho s e  cus tomers in the high priority clas s who
face only the low ene rgy price for all units of energy consumed . 
The s econd method divides the s ame windfall gains to o l d  
ener gy s o urces equally among a l l  consumers . Each cus tomer would face 
a price s t ructure based upon the cos ts o f  old ener gy for the first p 
uni ts o f  ener gy consumed and up on the c o s t s  o f  solar for the remaining 
uni ts . In Fi gure 2 ,  the p rice s t ructure is rep resented by price P c 
up to p p e rcent o f  ener <Y': use and P thereaf ter . S ince this would no t 0- s 
induce any convers ion to solar by cus tomers , the utility could then 
s imp ly ins tall solar energy sys tems in s ome locations , each of which 
woul d produce 100 - q pe rcent o f  the energy on the s i t e  by s o lar 
techno logy b ut at no change in energy cos ts to the particular cus tomer 
tha t received the solar converter . Of  cours e ,  the utility would have 
to be enp owered with the ri ght to require that the app rop riate p roportion
of cus tomers adop t so lar-as s i s t  sys tems , s ubj ect  to some s o r t  o f  
regulato ry and/ o r  j udicial review wi th regard to forced convers ions . 
Regulators could guide the coercive convers ion pro gram by e s t ab li shing 
p riorities by user clas s , as in the firs t me tho d . 
The firs t method does no t require that utilities be engaged
in the solar energy b us ines s .  Cus tomers granted limited access to 
convent ional ener gy s o urces have adequate incentives to make optimal 
choi ces among alternative s trategies : p urchas ing energy from new 
s ources- ( s uch as s olar) and engagin g in conservation . Cus tomers
with unlimi ted access to conventional energy at the low his to ri cal 
c o s t  have no incentive to convert to o ther s o ur ces . If the s i z e  
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o f  the lat t e r  group is correc t ly s elected , th is will no t lead to a 
s o ci ally ine f ficient amount o f  s o lar energy c onve r s ion . But this
me tho d will no t ,  in general , provi de ap p ropr iate incent ives to inves t 
in ener gy co ns e rving a c t ivi t i e s , s uch as insulation . Even if a l l
cus tomers , including the favored group , face a marginal energy 
p rice that  refle c t s  t rue marginal energy cos ts , the s ame failure o f  
the price system discussed above i n  t h e  c on text o f  solar conversion 
can occur . Tha t  i s , the marginal p ri ce of energy may p revail over 
t o o  narrow a range of energy us e t o  induce swi tching to a cons ervation
techni que that exhib i t s  s cale e c onomies at each s ite of use . 
The. s econd metho d ,  as des crib e d , does requi re that utili ties 
ent e r  the s o l ar energy b us ine s s ,  for only they will have an incen t ive 
to make app rop riate convers ions to s olar sys t ems . Mo reove r , th i s  
a l t erna t ive requi r es cons i derab ly mo re re gula to ry  over s igh t than the 
firs t , in p a r t to l imi t ine ffi cient development in so lar techno lo gy 
owing to the p e rve rs e incent ive s  p res en t ed t o firms by p r i c e  re gula tion 
an d in part to provi de due p rocess  p ro t e c t ion to individuals who are 
coerced into p e rmi tting the ins tallat ion of s o l ar energy equipment 
on their  p roperty . Final ly , as wi th the fi rs t me tho d , this appro ach 
will no t ,  in gene ral , provide adequate incentives for energy conservat ion . 
By cas t ing b o th me thods in the form o f  sys tems to allocate 
property rights to old s ources o f  energy , a third me thod emerges tha t  
would achi eve e f f i cient conve r s ion t o  s o lar o r  o ther exo t i c  s our ces 
o f  energy and cons ervation without req uiring that utilities b e allowed 
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to enter th e s o lar busir.e s s  or tha t  coe r c ion b e  use. d  to induce s o lar 
developmen t . In add i t ion , it would achieve ano ther goal of the
s e c ond method ,  which is to s p read the windfall gains that would
ac c rue t o  owner s  of old energy res o urc es re l ative ly equally among 
energy cons umers . All o f  the s e  obj e c t ives could b e  accomp lished by
the following po li cy . Firs t ,  energy prices would b e  allowed to r i s e
t o  t h e  p oi n t  that would p revail i f  all windfall gain s  were act ually 
cap tured by owners o f  old  energy s o urces ( t o  p rice P2  in the Fi gure s ) . 
S econd ,  coup ons would be p rinted that entitled the holder to p urchase 
a uni t of energy at the p rice b ased upon the original c o s t  of o ld 
ene rgy res ources ( in the Fi gures , P ) . The numb e r  o f  c o up ons p rin ted 
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would , in to tal , create ri gh ts to p urchas e all o f  the inexp ens ive 
ene rgy that was availab le at i t s  true c o s t . Each cus tomer would b e  
given some numb e r  o f coupons b as e d  upon the e q u i ty obj e c t ives o f  the 
gove rnmen t .  Any mechanism o f  dis tribut ing the c oup ons , including a 
p ropo r t ion o f historical us e or an equal p e r  cap i ta amo un t ,  wi l l
w ork as long as one ' s  current energy us e has no e f fe c t  on the 
f uture dis tribution of coup ons . Finally , ene rgy use rs , utilities 
and anyone else w o u l d  be p ermit t ed t o  b uy and s e l l  coup ons . 
The market pr ice f o r  coup ons would qui ckly b e  es tab l i shed 
at the difference b e tween old and new energy p r i ces , and some ene rgy 
us e rs wo uld p erce ive th" t by s el l ing coup ons at this p ri c e  and 
ins tal ling solar energy they c o ul d  come out ahead . Mo reove r ,  i f  
ut i l i t i e s  we r e  p e rmit ted t o  b uy coup ons , in addi tion to b eing requi red
to accep t them in lie u  of u t i l i ty bi lls , a t  wha teve r p rice was 
accep tab l e  to c ons umers ,  the rap id es tab lishment of a c oup on market
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would b e  assured . If utilities could b uy coupons at a price somewhat 
b elow th e d i f fe rence in old and new energy c o s t s  in return for 
providing a conveni ent coupon mark e t  for consume rs, they could also 
come o ut ah ead since a coupon purchas ed by a utility would represent 
one less unit of ene rgy that had to be sold at the o l d  pric e . 
The preced in g  mechanism i s  a natural e xt ens ion o f  the method 
us ed in the 1 9 6 0 s  to allocate oil import quotas and the entitlements 
program currently us e d  b y  the Federal Ener gy Adminis t ra t ion to prevent 
owners of old petroleum reserve s from capturing wind fall gains owing 
to the increas e in the w o r l d  price o � o il that occurred in 1973 . In 
e s s ence , the coupon proposal e s tablishes entitlements among consumers 
to cheap energy s o urces . In additi on , it has an advan tage not shared 
by the en t i tlement program in tha t it allows energy pric e s  to r e f l e c t
marginal costs . B ecause entitlements i n  the o i l  r e fining b us in e s s
a r e  b as e d  upon current rat her than histo r ical energy use , the l a t t e r
program also caus es the price o f  o i l  to re finers to e q ual ave r a ge 
rather than marginal cost, thereby encouraging uneconomical u s e  o f  
2 3  petroleum . 
Creating tradeable ri ghts to cheap energy allows government 
to allocate the b en e f i t s  ac cruing from cheap energy sources in any 
way it see s  fit s imply by appropr iate choice of the initial d i s t rib u t i on 
o f  the coupons . Once the coupons have b een distributed ,  prices o f
energy can b e  set equal to marginal cos t  wi thout fear o f  windfall 
gain s  accruing to produc e rs .  Instead , the windf all wi l l  accrue to 
coupon holders . Moreover ,  the system creates the proper incentives 
for individual energy us e Y s  to switch to new energy sources and to 
r -
engage in energy conserv&tion . Cons equent ly , it eliminat es the 
argument in favor of uti l ity ownership of solar energy reso urces . 
CONCLU S I ONS 
B e caus e of the unavo i d ab l e  imp er fec t ions in re gula tion , 
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a de centrali z e d ,  competi t ive s o lut ion t o  the p r o b l e m  of solar energy 
deve lopment has gre at meri t .  Jhe us e o f  tradeab l e  p ro p e r ty rights 
and peak-load pricing allows competitive, unre gula t ed s o l a r  ene r gy 
deve lopment and provi d es appropriate incent ives to consumers in 
selec t in g  energy s o u rces . 
Whe ther u tili t ie s should be permitte d into the o n- s i t e
solar energy busin e s s a t  a l l  r emains a n  o p e n  que stion : it holds 
dan g e r s  owing to imp erf e cti ons in regulati on , b u t  i t  h o l d s  p romi s e
i n  that gas uti li t ie s , i n  p articular, are cur ren tly at the fore front
of at le as t s ome typ e s  of s o lar eq uipmen t and p o s s e s s  an e spec ially 
s t rong incentive -- name ly , long-run c o r p o r a t e  s urvival -- to make 
the techno lo gy wo rk . P e rhap s the best alternative i s  to a l low 
utilities to enter th e bus ine s s , b ut to requi re that their s o l ar 
energy activities be handled through s e p arate , unregulated a f filiates 
and that s o lar an d re gulat ed u t i l i ty s e rvi ces be sold and priced
ind ependen t ly . This would enable a solar energy cus tomer to select 
f r om among comp e t i t ive suppliers while fac in g a price for conven tional
s e rvi c e  that did no t depend on the source of s o lar e quipmen t . A 
u t i l i ty mi gh t s t ill deci de to operate a solar energy a f f i l i a t e  at a 
lo s s , b ut at leas t such b ehavior could re la tive ly e as ily be attacked 
through antitrust or re gulatory action owin g to the sepa ration o f  solar 
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and o ther bus ine s s  a.c itvities and , there fo r e , t h e  rela tive eas e  with 
wh ich op e r a t in g  l o s s e s  could be ob s erve d . 
Uti litie s would s t ill h ave s ome thing of an advan tage in 
s e l l ing s o lar t echno l o gy , in part b e caus e o f  the i r  exper ience in 
retailing ene rgy and in part b e cause of the relat ively l ow co s t s  of 
c ap i tal they face due t o  th e i r  p ro t e c t e d , regula te d  s ta tus in mainline 
a c tivi t ie s . Although the magn i t ude of the s e  advan tages is s urely n o t
known , i t  is un like ly t o  b e  s uf f i c iently imp o rtant that i t  wo u l d  
p re c lude entry in t o  the s o la r  equipment b u s iness by an e f f i cient 
p o t ential s up p l i e r . 
The p re c e d in g  anlys is indi c a t e s  that th e c ur rent prob lem 
of p romo t ing e f f i cient energy us e wh ile p reve n t in g  windfall gains 
t o  owners of old energy s o ur c e s  has a relat ive ly s imp le r e s o lution . 
Th e heart o f  the p r ob lem l i e s  in r a t i onali z in g  th e p r i c e  s t ructure 
for energy and all o c a t in g  the rap i d  inc rease in the value o f  _ cheap
energy re s ources that has o c c urred b e c aus e of inc reases in the c o s t s  
o f  new ene r gy  s o urces . A sy s t em o f  t radeab l e  ener gy c o up ons can
res o lve the prob lem of windfall gain s without p lacing limi t s  on
ma rke t p r i c es , and a c o s t-- s ens i t ive p r i c e  s t ruc ture , including time - o f-day 
variati ons in p r i c e s , can gene ra te the p r o p e r  incentives for cho o sing
among alt ernat ive ene rgy s o urces . Cons equen t ly , the equity p rob lem 
c an be s o lve d  with one ins trumen t and th e e f f i c iency p rob lem can 
be re s o lved in the marke t .  Th i s  e l iminates the need for e xp anding
the domain of u t i l i ty regulat ion into the s o lar energy field by ei the:.: 
s t a t e  o f  f e d e ral re gul a t o ry autho r i t ies . It d o e s  require tha t  utili ties 
no t be p e rmi t ted to s t a r t  a regula t e d  s o lar ene r gy b us ines s,, b ut there
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app ears to b e  no s t rong nrgument f o r  keep ing them o u t of th e unre gula ted 
s ol ar ener gy b us iness as long as they do so thro ugh comp l e t e ly 
independent co rp o r at e  a f � i l ia t e s . A p r o gram al ong the s e  l ines s e ems 
cap ab le of s erving the twin obj e c t ive s of e f f i c ient us e of s o lar and 
o ther ene rgy techno logies and equi tab l e  dis t r ib u t i o n  of the s o c i e tal
c o s t s  of ris ing ene rgy p r i c es . 
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